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I. Introduction
Are federal regulatory laws that are completely silent about their
applicability to Indian nations nevertheless applicable to such nations inside
Indian reservations? There are many such laws: The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),1 the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 2 the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 3 the Age Discrimination in
Employment act (ADEA), 4 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 5
and even the Affordable Care Act. 6 With the development of Indian gaming
and the diversification of tribal economies bringing about a proliferation of
tribally owned corporations, whether such laws are applicable to tribally
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 651 (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 18081 (2012). See Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Burwell, 118 F. Supp.
3d 1264, 1281 (D. Wyo. 2015) (treating tribal employers as “large employers” under section
18081(f)(2)(A) because Indian tribes were not specifically excluded from the definition).
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owned businesses is an increasingly frequently asked and litigated question.
In all of these laws, Indian nations are not mentioned in the text of the
statute or in the legislative history. The question, therefore, is whether to
interpret this congressional silence as including or excluding tribal
organizations from the laws’ coverage.
Indian nations have been recognized as having the inherent
sovereignty to exercise a number of governmental powers over their
reservations. 7 Because in many cases, application of such federal regulatory
laws would interfere with tribal sovereignty, a decision to apply these laws
to Indian nations inside reservations is a question that goes to the essence of
how federal courts should view tribal sovereignty. 8 Yet, even though the
Supreme Court has issued many opinions concerning the extent of tribal
sovereignty, especially as it relates to tribal jurisdiction over non-members, 9
or the application of state laws inside Indian reservations,10 it has never
directly addressed this particular issue. 11
Faced with this congressional and Supreme Court silence, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals have, since the early 1980s, developed at least
four principal approaches in interpreting this congressional silence. Most
circuits today are following an approach first developed in 1980 by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Farris. 12 This approach is now known as
the Coeur d’Alene approach from the first case that applied a general
federal regulatory law to a tribally owned enterprise. 13 Under this approach,
7. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1981).
8. This Article will generally refer to “Indian nations” and “Indian tribes”
interchangeably. Although the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution refers to
Congress having the power to regulate Commerce with Indian “tribes,” many treaties were
subsequently signed between the United States and Indian “nations.”
9. See generally Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001);
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and
Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
10. See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Braker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980),
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980),
California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490
U.S. 163 (1989).
11. There are currently, however, two petitions for certiorari, both filed on February
12th 2016, pending in front of the Supreme Court: NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir.
2015).
12. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980).
13. Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). In Farris,
it was the application of a criminal law, the Organized Crime Control Act, to individual
Indians owning a casino on the reservation. In Coeur d’Alene, it was the applicability of
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the legislative silence is interpreted as creating a presumption that the
federal regulatory law applies to Indian tribes but allows the presumption to
be rebutted if application of the federal law would interfere with purely
intramural aspects of tribal self-governance, or with a right reserved by the
tribe in a treaty. 14 If the treaty or tribal self-governance exceptions apply,
courts have required clear evidence of congressional intent to apply the law
to the tribes. The Coeur d’Alene approach has been followed in the
Second, 15 Sixth, 16 Seventh, 17 and Eleventh Circuits. 18
A second approach was more recently developed by the D.C. Circuit
in San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB. 19 This approach could be called the
“Spectrum of Sovereignty” approach because under it, the general federal
law will more likely not be applied to Indian nations if such application
would interfere with more “traditional” aspects of tribal self-government
but will be applied if it tends to interfere only with more “commercial”
aspects of tribal self-government such as, for instance, the operation of a
tribal casino.
Unlike both of these approaches which determine applicability of the
federal law based on what kind of tribal sovereign powers are being
interfered with, a Sixth Circuit panel recently decided the issue by putting
the burden on the Indian nations to show that they had enough sovereignty
left to preempt the federal law. 20 After stating that Indian tribes retained all
their original sovereign powers unless such powers have been taken away
by Congress, given up in treaties, or were lost through implicit divestiture
OSHA to a tribally owned enterprise.
14. 624 F.2d 890, at 893–94. The court also mentioned that the presumption could also
be rebutted if it could be proven by other evidence that Congress did not intend the law to
apply. There seems to be no cases that have ever applied this third exception in order to
rebut the presumption of applicability. It would seem that the presumption could be rebutted
either by legislative history, some kind of structural analysis of the statute, or some historical
understanding that tribes were to be exempted from application of the law.
15. Mashantucket Sand and Gravel v. Reich, 95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996).
16. See NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015),
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1024).
17. See generally Smart v. State Farm Insurance, 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).
18. See generally Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126 (11th
Cir. 1999).
19. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
20. See Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015), petition for cert.
filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2016) (No. 15-1034) (acknowledging that a previous panel in a different
case, NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015), had
adopted the Coeur d’Alene approach, however, petition for certiorari in that case was also
filed February 12, 2016).
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as a result of their status as domestic dependent nations, the panel took into
consideration the evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence on the extent of
retained tribal sovereignty over individuals who are not tribal members.
Because the panel adopted the concept of implicit divestiture as set forth in
the leading case, Montana v. United States, 21 I will refer to this approach as
the “Montana framework” approach.
A fourth approach developed by the Tenth Circuit in NLRB v. Pueblo
of San Juan, 22 adopted the opposite take on who has the burden to show
preemption. Instead of asking whether the tribes have enough sovereignty
to preempt the federal law, the court viewed the central question as whether
Congress in enacting the NLRA had the intent to preempt Indian tribes
from enacting right-to-work laws which may conflict with the NLRA
requirements. Because the Pueblo of San Juan court also found that “in
addition to broad authority over intramural maters such as membership,
tribes retain sovereign authority to regulate economic activity within their
own territory,” 23 it concluded that “[p]reempting tribal laws divests tribes of
their retained sovereign authority . . . In the absence of clear evidence of
congressional intent, therefore, federal law will not be read as stripping
tribes of their retained sovereign authority to pass right-to-work laws and be
governed by them.” 24 Unlike the Ninth and the D.C. Circuits, therefore, the
Tenth Circuit considered congressional “silence” as creating a presumption
of non-applicability. Furthermore, unlike the approaches developed in the
other circuits, instead of focusing on what kind of tribal sovereign powers
are being interfered with, the Tenth Circuit asked the more appropriate and
relevant question which is what indicia of legislative intent should courts
demand of Congress before tribal sovereignty can be abrogated.
This Article takes the position that the meaning of congressional
silence concerning application of these federal laws to Indian nations
should be determined using a theory of statutory interpretation called
“practical reasoning” which is a methodology first developed by Professors
Philip Frickey and William Eskridge. 25 In their seminal work, Professors
Frickey and Eskridge criticized the courts’ exclusive reliance on what they
call “foundational” theories of statutory interpretation. These are theories
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1192–93.
Id. at 1195.
William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) [hereinafter “Practical Reasoning”].
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that propose a unitary foundation for statutory interpretation. The three
main ones being “intentionalism,” “purposivism,” and “textualism.”
Frickey and Eskridge argued that “[e]ach of the three grand theories seeks
to reconcile statutory interpretation by unelected judges with the
assumptions of majoritarian political theory.” 26 Judges do this because they
are concerned that their own interpretations will be criticized as being the
product of raw political preferences and therefore illegitimate.
Although judges may claim they rely on only one of the
foundationalist theories, practical reasoning suggests that in many cases,
judges rely not only on all three foundationalist theories when interpreting
statutes, but also add a good dose of practical or pragmatic reasoning in
making their decisions. Thus, “practical reasoning” starts first with textual
considerations (textualism), 27 moves next to historical considerations to
understand the original legislative expectations (a mix of intentionalism and
purposivism), 28 before ending with what the authors call “evolutive
considerations.” 29 This last step starts with considering how implementation
of the statute has changed over time, and ends with an appraisal of how any
proposed interpretation would fit with constitutional values, current
congressional policies, and general ideas of fairness. 30 “Practical reasoning”
is therefore both descriptive and prescriptive. It not only describes what
judges actually do when interpreting statutes but also provides normative
justifications for why interpretations reached through that method are
legitimate. According to Eskridge and Frickey, “practical reasoning,”
“means an approach that eschews objectivist theories in favor of a mixture
of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of the common
law), seeking contextual justification for the best legal answer among the
potential alternatives.” 31
“Practical reasoning” is especially well suited to determining the issue
of applicability of federal laws to Indian nations because in the cases
referred above, the circuits are not focusing on statutory meaning or
congressional intent but on how to interpret congressional silence.
“Practical reasoning” is also appropriate here because as once argued by
Professor Frickey, when it comes to statutory interpretation in Federal
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 325.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 356.
Id. at 358.
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 25, at 359.
Id. at 322 n.3.
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Indian law, the Supreme Court is making its decisions largely along
pragmatic considerations based on contextual and historical realities.32
In order to make these points, Part II sets forth and evaluates the
various methodologies adopted by the circuits in determining whether to
apply general federal regulatory laws to Indian nations. Part III applies
“practical reasoning” methodology to this problem. After examining the
contextual background of tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law through
analysis of relevant Supreme Court precedents, the Article evaluates
various practical considerations as well as current congressional policies,
before concluding that the approaches developed by the Tenth Circuit in
Pueblo of San Juan and in a Seventh Circuit opinion authored by Judge
Posner, 33 are more consistent with Supreme Court precedents as well as
with “practical reasoning.” 34

32. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law. 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1234 (1990) (“The cases
approach the problems with respect for tradition of Indian sovereignty, avoid adopting
formal concepts that sweep away potential contextual concerns, and ultimately place the
dispute where the best case for tribal sovereignty can develop, in a case-by-case, contextual
manner consistent with Indian tradition and contemporary circumstances.”) [hereinafter
Congressional Intent]. Professor Frickey based this observation on cases such as Solemn v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206 (1983);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). In later writings, Professor Frickey
noted that in its latest federal Indian law decisions, the Court was “jerry-rigging a ruthlessly
pragmatic blend of federal Indian law with general American law.” Philip P. Frickey,
(Native) American Law Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 460
(2005).
33. See generally Reich v. Great Lake Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490
(7th Cir. 1993).
34. Although the position adopted in this Article may allow Indian tribes to more
readily avoid the application of general federal regulatory laws, this should not be an
indication that, politically speaking, I am against laws imposing regulations protecting
workers in the workplace or allowing these workers to unionize. In this fashion, I am
sympathetic to the views of those scholars who have encouraged tribes to enact regulations
protecting workers in a tribal environment. See generally Jonathan Guss, Gaming
Sovereignty? A Plea for Protecting Workers Rights While Preserving Sovereignty, 102
CALIF L. REV. 1623 (2014); DAVID KEMPER, THE WORK OF SOVEREIGNTY: TRIBAL LABOR
RELATIONS AND SELF-DETERMINATION AT THE NAVAJO NATION (2010).
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II. Interpreting Silence in the Circuits
A. Silence as a Presumption of Applicability
1. The Ninth Circuit “Intramural Aspects” Approach.

The issue in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene was the application of OSHA
to the Coeur d’Alene tribal farm. The Ninth Circuit’s approach starts with a
presumption that the law applies to tribes. That presumption is derived from
dicta in a Supreme Court case to the effect that it was “now well settled by
many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying all
persons include Indians and their property interests.” 35 That presumption in
turn can be rebutted if: “(1) the law touches ‘exclusive rights of selfgovernance in purely intramural matters, (2) the application of the law to
the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties, or (3) there is
proof by legislative or some other means that Congress intended the law not
to apply to Indians on their reservations.” 36
Having enunciated its legal principle, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the operation of a farm that sells produce on the open market and in
interstate commerce should be covered under OSHA . “Because the Farm
employs non-Indians . . . and because it is in virtually every respect a
normal commercial farming enterprise, we believe that its operation free of
federal health and safety regulations is “neither profoundly intramural nor
essential to self-government.” 37
The Ninth Circuit decision to apply OSHA to tribal commercial
enterprises was followed by the Seventh Circuit, 38 as well as the Second
Circuit. 39 In addition to OSHA, commercial enterprises on Indian
reservations also have to abide by the FLSA. 40 Similarly, tribal health
centers have been held to be covered under ERISA. 41 In another case, the
Eleventh Circuit found that under the Coeur D’Alene approach, a tribally
owned restaurant and entertainment facility was subject to the ADA. 42
35.
36.
37.
38.

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id.
See generally Menominee Tribal Enterprises v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir.

2010).

39.
40.
41.
42.

See generally Reich v. Mashantucket Sand and Gravel, 95 F.3d (2d Cir. 1996).
See generally Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009).
See generally Smart v. State Farm, 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).
Florid Paraplegic Ass. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1126 (11th Cir. 1999).
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However, the Eleventh Circuit in that case also found that the tribe could
not be sued because the ADA had not waived sovereign immunity. 43
Finally the Sixth Circuit recently used the “intramural aspect” approach to
hold that the NLRA was applicable to a tribally owned casino. 44
Coeur d’Alene’s “intramural aspect” approach adopts a very restrictive
and narrow view of tribal sovereignty. Under that approach, federal
regulatory laws will almost always be found applicable to the tribes. There
are, however, a few exceptions. Thus, the ADEA was found not applicable
to a dispute between a Tribal Housing Authority and one of its employees
who was a member of that tribe. 45 There is also one district court decision
within the Ninth Circuit that did not follow the Seventh Circuit decision in
Smart v. State Farm, 46 and refused to apply ERISA to a tribally owned
lumber mill. 47 Furthermore, the FLSA was found not applicable to the
operations of the Navajo Nation’s Division of Public Safety, an agency in
charge of law enforcement within the Navajo reservation. 48
2. Evaluating the “Intramural Aspects” Approach.
Because the “purely intramural” approach has already been
overwhelmingly criticized by scholars, 49 I am going to briefly summarize
here the main arguments against the doctrine. The major problem with the
43. Id. at 1131–34. This decision nicely highlights the irrational difference in
treatment between abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity which under Supreme Court
precedents, requires clear evidence of congressional intent, and abrogation of other tribal
sovereign rights not specifically retained in a treaty which under Coeur d’Alene, require
clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate only if they can be considered to involve
“strictly intramural aspects” of tribal sovereignty. Why the different treatment?
44. NLRB v. Little River Band, 788 F.3d 537, 548 (6th Cir. 2015).
45. See generally EEOC v. Karuk Tribe, 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001); Lumber
Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prod. Indus., 730 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Cal.
1990).
46. Smart v. State Farm, 868 F. 2d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. Lumber Indus. Pension Fund. 730 F. Supp. at 324 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
48. Snyder v. Navajo Nation, 382 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir 2004).
49. Vicki J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency. 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681
(1994); Kaighn Smith Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and Judicial Restraint: The Problem of
Labor and Employment Relations within the Reservation, 2008 MICH. S. L. REV. 505, 538–
42 (2008), Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV.
691, 702–07 (2004), see generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of
General Application to Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85
(1991).
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doctrine is that the Coeur d’Alene court relied on a Supreme Court case,
FPC v. Tuscarora, 50 which did not hold that federal regulatory laws that do
not mention Indians are presumptively applicable to Indian tribes inside
their reservations. In Tuscarora, the Federal Power Commission (FPA) was
trying to condemn land owned in fee by the Tuscarora Indian Nation Act
for a flood control project. The FPA exempted Indian reservations and the
crucial issue was whether the land in question, which was owned in fee by
the tribe, could be considered an Indian reservation under the Act and thus
exempted from condemnation. The FPA was not, therefore, a federal law of
general applicability not mentioning Indians or Indian tribes. The Court
held that these tribal fee lands were not a “reservation” under the FPA. 51
The Tuscarora tribe also argued that even if its fee land could not be
considered part of the reservation, it was exempted from the FPA under the
doctrine of Elk v. Wilkens. 52 In Elk, the Court held that an Indian born on an
Indian reservation did not become a United States citizen pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, “[u]nder
the constitution as originally established . . . General acts of congress did
not apply to Indians, unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention
to include them.” 53 It is to answer this argument that the Court stated its
now famous dicta that “it is now well settled by many decisions of this
Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians
and their property interests.” 54 So, at most, the Tuscarora dicta was directed
at “Indians and their property” outside Indian reservations. 55
Besides relying on Farris, the Coeur d’Alene Court cited tax cases, 56
another case which, like Farris, applied federal criminal laws to individual
50. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 111 (1960).
51. Id. at 142. That finding was controversial and probably erroneous, Justice Black’s
dissenting opinion ended by stating “I regret that this Court is to be the governmental agency
that breaks faith with this dependent people. Great nations, like great men, should keep their
word.”
52. See generally Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
53. Id. at 116.
54. See id. (citing cases involving federal taxation of individual Indians for its general
rule, Five Civilized Tribes v. Comm’r, 295 U.S. 418 (1935); Choteau v. Burnet 283 U.S. 691
(1931); Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943)).
55. The Tenth Circuit has similarly distinguished Tuscarora as only applying to
“Indians and their property” but not to situation where the tribe was exercising its sovereign
governmental power. See NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1198–99 (10th Cir.
2002).
56. Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Kurtz 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982); Fry
v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977).
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Indians, 57 and one case, United States v. Fryberg, which held that the Eagle
Protection Act abrogated the hunting treaty rights of Indian tribes. 58 To the
extent that Fryberg is interpreted as allowing abrogation of treaty rights
without clear evidence of congressional intent, it is no longer good law. 59
The only case cited in Coeur d’Alene which was remotely relevant to the
application of general federal regulatory laws to Indian nations was Navajo
Tribe v. NLRB. 60 This appears to have been the very first case which cited
Tuscarora for the proposition that general federal laws could be applicable
inside Indian reservations even if such laws never mentioned Indians.
However, in this case, the NLRA was being applied to a non-Indian owned
mining corporation, not to a tribally owned one. 61
A second criticism is that the limits on rights of tribal self-governance
to “purely intramural” aspects is not based on any relevant Supreme Court
precedents. As stated earlier, the Coeur d’Alene court relied on United
States v. Farris for its “purely intramural aspect” restriction on tribal selfgovernment. 62 Farris cited Santa Clara for its “intramural” phraseology. In
Santa Clara, after stating, “Indian tribes are ‘distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights’ in matters of local selfgovernment. Although no longer ‘possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty,’ they remain a ‘separate people, with the power of regulating
their internal and social relations,’” 63 the Supreme Court pointed to such
57. United States v. Burn 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1975).
58. United States v. Fryburg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1980).
59. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986); but see Fryberg, 622 F.2d at
1016
Even though there was no express statement on the “face of the Act” or in the
legislative history that Congress intended to abrogate or modify Indian treaty
hunting rights, we are convinced that it is clear from the “surrounding
circumstances” and “legislative history”, including the broad purpose of the Act
to protect the bald eagle and prevent its extinction, that Congress intended to
modify Indian treaty rights to prohibit the taking of bald eagles.
60. Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
61. See id.at 165
Here, the Act clearly applies to the Texas-Zinc Minerals Corporation, the
employer-intervenor, because it is engaged in the production of goods for
interstate commerce, and labor disputes in its plant would clearly ‘affect
commerce’ within the meaning of the Act. The circumstance that the
Corporation's plant is located on the Navajo Reservation cannot remove it or its
employees—be they Indians or not—from the coverage of the Act.
62. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (citing United States
624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980)).
63. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citations omitted).
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areas as tribal control of membership, domestic relations, and inheritance,
as examples of tribal governing powers. 64 This list was obviously not meant
to be all inclusive. As explained in the next few paragraphs, this is evident
from the Court’s reliance on Williams v. Lee at the end of that sentence. 65
After stating that tribal sovereignty was limited to purely intramural
aspects, the court quoted from Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle for the
proposition that,
[o]ver the years this original concept of tribal sovereignty has been
modified to permit application of state law to reservation Indians in
matters not considered essential to tribal self-government, but the basic
principle that the Indian tribes retain exclusive jurisdiction over essential
matters of reservation government, in the absence of specific
Congressional limitation, has remained. 66

As the language indicates, “essential matters” of tribal self-government is
clearly not the same as “purely intramural matters.” Interestingly, the Ninth
Circuit in Arizona ex. rel Merrill had also relied on Williams v. Lee for its
statement. 67
Williams is the landmark decision where the Court held that a nonIndian trader could not sue a Navajo Indian in state court to recover a debt
the Navajo had incurred on the reservation. The Court there famously
stated,
Over the years this Court has modified these principles [denying state
jurisdiction] in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved
and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic
policy of Worcester has remained . . . Essentially, absent governing Acts
of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them. 68

It is clear that the matter in Williams v. Lee was not a “purely intramural”
one as it involved a dispute between a tribal member and a non-Indian. Yet
the Court held that essential tribal relations were involved because,
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 56 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
Arizona ex rel. Edgar Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 1969).
Id. (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)).
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on
the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The
cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian
governments over their reservations. 69

3. The D.C. Circuit “Spectrum of Sovereignty” Approach.
In San Manuel Indian Bingo v. NLRB, 70 the D.C. Circuit upheld the
Board’s decision to assume jurisdiction over labor relations within a tribally
owned casino on an Indian reservation. The court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court had delineated principles which were “superficially at least,
in conflict.” 71 On one side, there was the Tuscarora dictum, which the court
interpreted as presuming applicability of the federal regulations unless the
law interfered with purely intramural aspects of self-governance. On the
other were the canons of statutory interpretation according to which
“(1) ambiguities in a federal statute must be resolved in favor of Indians,
and (2) a clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary before a
court may construe a federal statute so as to impair tribal sovereignty.” 72
After finding that the first canon was not applicable when a statute was not
enacted specifically for the benefit of Indians, the San Manuel court stated
that it did not have to choose between the second canon, also known as the
Santa Clara principle, and the Tuscarora principle because “we can
reconcile this principle with Tuscarora by recognizing that, in some cases
at least, a statute of general application can constrain the actions of a tribal
government without at the same time impairing tribal sovereignty.” 73 The
court reached that conclusion by adopting what could be called a “spectrum
of sovereignty” approach where core tribal sovereignty centers on the
tribe’s exercise of “traditional” governmental functions affecting tribal
members on tribal lands while the peripheral areas of tribal sovereignty
extends to the regulation of tribal commercial activities extending beyond
the reservations and involving non-members either as customers or
employees. 74 The court stated
69. Id. at 223.
70. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1308 (D.C. Cir.
2007).

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
See id. at 1312–13
An examination of Supreme Court cases shows tribal sovereignty to be at its

136

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123 (2016)
In sum, the Supreme court decisions reflects an earnest concern for
maintaining tribal sovereignty, but they also recognize that tribal
governments engage in a varied range of activities many of which are
not activities we normally associate with governance. These activities
include . . . commercial enterprises that tend to blur any distinction
between the tribal government and a private corporation. 75

Although the Court acknowledged that application of the NLRA may
infringe on tribal sovereignty in some circumstances, this was not the case
here as the court concluded that “impairment of tribal sovereignty is
negligible in this context, as the tribe’s activity was primarily commercial
and its enactment of labor legislation and its execution of a gaming compact
were ancillary to that commercial activity.” 76 The court also noted that the
operation of a casino was not a traditional governmental function and that
the vast majority of employees and customers were non-tribal members not
living on the reservation. 77
In the last part of the San Manuel decision, the court discussed
whether the term “employer” under the NLRA included Indian tribal
governments operating commercial enterprises. 78 Relying on decisions by
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, 79 the Pueblo had made the argument that
because the NLRA had exempted from its application “any wholly owned
government corporation . . . or any State or political subdivision thereof,” 80
tribally owned corporations should also be excluded. 81 Finding no
indication of congressional intent whatsoever, the court applied Chevron
deference to the agency’s decision to include tribal commercial enterprises

strongest when explicitly established by a treaty, or when a tribal government
acts within the borders of its reservation, in a matter of concern only to members
of the tribe. Examples of such intramural matters include regulating the status of
tribe members in relation to one another, and determining tribe membership.
Conversely, when a tribal government goes beyond matters of internal selfgovernance and enters into off-reservation business transaction with nonIndians, its claim of sovereignty is at its weakest.
75. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1314 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
76. Id. at 1315.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1993); NLRB v.
Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012).
81. San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
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as “employers” under the Act. 82 Under Chevron, if a statutory term is
ambiguous and Congress has delegated the power to make binding
interpretations to the agency, a court will uphold the agency’s interpretation
as long as it is permissible or reasonable. 83 After acknowledging that the
tribe’s argument is “certainly plausible,” the court held that, nevertheless, it
could not say that the Board’s interpretation decision was not a permissible
construction of the statute. 84 The use of Chevron deference in Part III.B. of
the opinion is surprising since earlier in the opinion, in Part III.A., the court
had stated, “[b]ecause the Board’s expertise and delegated authority does
not relate to federal Indian law, we need not defer to the Board’s
conclusion. Therefore we decide de novo the implications of tribal
sovereignty on the statutory construction question before us.” 85 As some
other scholars have noted, the two parts of Part III cannot be reconciled
with each other. 86
4. Evaluating the “Spectrum of Sovereignty” Approach.
In addition to also erroneously relying on Tuscarora, a major criticism
of the San Manuel approach is that the distinguishing between tribal
sovereign powers on a traditional-commercial spectrum conflicts with the
spirit, if not the holding, of many recent Supreme Court opinions. 87 There
are no Supreme Court precedents mandating different treatment for
“traditional” instead of “commercial” activities when it comes to the
exercise of tribal sovereign powers. In effect, quite the opposite is true. In
refusing Michigan’s argument to overturn or modify Kiowa Tribe v.
Manufacturing Technology, 88 and deny the Tribe sovereign immunity when
operating a commercial gaming establishment, the Supreme Court in its
recent Bay Mills decision stated that in Kiowa Tribe,

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1316 (referring to Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
467 U.S. 837, 843.
San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.2d at 1316–17.
Id. at 1312.
Vicki J. Limas, The Tuscarorganization of the Tribal Workforce, 2008 MICH.
STATE L. REV. 467, 472–76 (2008); Brian H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Law, Indian
Sovereignty, and the Canons of Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413, 474–511 (2007).
87. For some insightful critical analysis, see Limas, supra note 86; Wildenthal, supra
note 86.
88. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Ind. Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998).
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[i]n rejecting the identical argument Michigan makes, our decision
reaffirmed a long line of precedents, concluding that “the doctrine of
tribal immunity”—without any exceptions for commercial or offreservation conduct—“is settled law and controls this case.” 89 Second,
we have relied on Kiowa subsequently: In another case involving a
tribe's off-reservation commercial conduct, we began our analysis with
Kiowa’s holding that tribal immunity applies to such activity (and then
found that the Tribe had waived its protection). 90

The Bay Mills Court ended its discussion by reiterating that the
arguments for limiting tribal sovereignty in the area of commercial
activities had all been made in Kiowa Tribe, and faced with these
arguments “[t]he decision could not have been any clearer: ‘We decline to
draw [any] distinction’ that would ‘confine [immunity] to reservations or to
noncommercial activities.’” 91 The Bay Mills and Kiowa Tribe decisions are
undoubtedly correct in affording the same kind of protection to traditional
and commercial governmental activities. The implication that tribal
involvement into commercial activities somehow deserves less protection
than “traditional” governmental functions is especially troublesome since,
as pointed out by Professor Matthew Fletcher, Indian tribes are desperately
in need of raising governmental revenues by different means since they do
not have any kind of substantial tax base. 92
B. Silence as Equivocal: The 6th Circuit “Montana Framework” Approach.
1. Soaring Eagle Casino v. NLRB. 93
As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, the Soaring Eagle
court adopted what could be termed a “Montana framework” analysis as the
governing methodology for determining if application of federal regulatory
laws to a reservation-based tribally owned enterprise would infringe on
tribal sovereignty. 94 After acknowledging that it was bound by a previous
89. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Comm’n,134 S. Ct 2024, 2038 (2014) (quoting
Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 756 (1998)).
90. Id. (citing to C&L Enter. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indians, 121 S. Ct. 1589
(2001)).
91. Id. at 2038 (quoting Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 523 U.S. at 758).
92. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development
as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759 (2004).
93. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).
94. At least one scholar had previously recommended such an approach. See generally
Kaighn Smith Jr., Tribal Self-Determination and Judicial Restraint, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV.
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6th Circuit decision which had adopted the Coeur d’Alene “purely
intramural aspect,” 95 approach, the panel stated that it disagreed with that
approach and proceeded on explaining “the approach that we believe is
most consistent with Supreme Court precedent.” 96
The Soaring Eagle court took the position that the question to be
answered in such cases was “whether a tribe has the inherent sovereign
authority necessary to prevent application of a federal statute to tribal
activity.” 97 After noting that the tribal casino employed many people who
were not tribal members, the court focused on whether the tribe had
retained sovereign powers to regulate these non-members. The extent of
tribal sovereign powers over non-members is determined by using an
analysis first delineated in Montana v. United States. 98 After first stating
that “exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation,” 99 the Montana court came up with a general rule
that “the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of nonmembers of the tribe.” 100 However, the Court immediately
identified two exceptions to this general rule:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on no-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing or other means the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealings, contracts, leases or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe. 101

After giving a comprehensive description of how this Montana
framework analysis should proceed when it comes to determining if a
505 (2008).
95. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort, 791 F.3d at 662, (citing to NLRB v. Little River
Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 666.
98. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
99. Id. at 564.
100. Id. at 565.
101. Id. at 565–66.
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federal law of general applicability should apply to Indian nations, 102 the
Sixth Circuit applied it to the facts of this case and concluded “the first
Montana exception concerning consensual commercial relationship
between the Tribe and nonmembers should apply to these facts.” 103 The
court explained that the consensual relations exception recognizes that, as a
sovereign, the tribe has the power to enter into contractual relations with
non-members working on the reservations and to place conditions in such
contracts. The court also summarized why under its “totality of the
circumstances” analysis, the tribal casino no-solicitation policy and its
termination of employees violating that policy fell under Montana’s first
exception. First, the operation of the casino was an important vehicle for the
exercise of sovereignty. Second, while employing many non-members, it
was mostly managed by tribal members. Third, revenues from the casino
constituted 90% of all tribal revenues and allowed the tribe to provide
essential government services to its members. 104 The court ended its
explanation by reminding us that the Supreme Court has recognized that
“the power and ability of a tribal government to raise revenues for its
essential services is an important aspect of tribal sovereignty.” 105
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion also contained a comprehensive discussion
of why a previous Sixth Circuit panel, which could not be overturned by a
102. See Soaring Eagle Resort & Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 667 (6th Cir. 2015)
If Congress has not so spoken, we would then determine if the generally
applicable federal regulatory statute impinges on the Tribe's control over its own
members and its own activities. If it has, the general regulatory statute will not
apply against the Tribe as a sovereign. If we find that the generally applicable
federal statute does not impinge on the Tribe's right to govern activities of its
members . . . we would assume that, generally, “the inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”
And we would determine, then, whether the Tribe has demonstrated that one of
the two Montana exceptions to the general rule . . . applies. When analyzing the
exceptions, we would apply a totality of the circumstances analysis . . . If one of
the exceptions applies, the generally applicable federal statute should not apply
to tribal conduct.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 668.
105. See id.
We believe that the weight of these factors supports our conclusion that the
NLRA should not apply to the Casino. We consider relevant: (1) the fact that the
Casino is on trust land and is considered a unit of the Tribe's government; (2) the
importance of the Casino to tribal governance and its ability to provide member
services; and (3) that Lewis (and other nonmembers) voluntarily entered into an
employment relationship with the Tribe.
(quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1981)).
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subsequent panel in the same circuit, was wrong to adopt the Coeur d’Alene
analysis and would have also been wrong to adopt the D.C. Circuit San
Manuel methodology. 106 On Coeur d’Alene, the court concluded with the
following observation,
Ultimately, we find that the Coeur d'Alene framework, and especially its
description of its first exception, overly constrains tribal sovereignty,
fails to respect the historic deference that the Supreme Court has given
to considerations of tribal sovereignty in the absence of congressional
intent to the contrary, and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court
directives in Montana and Hicks. 107

Concerning the D.C. Circuit’s commercial/traditional dichotomy, the court
stated that this “distinction distorts the crucial overlap between tribal
commercial development and government activity that is at the heart of the
federal policy of self-determination. Indeed, that distinction flies in the face
of congressional pronouncements to the contrary in the IGRA.” 108 The
court also stated that the distinction between traditional and commercial
governmental activities “ignores the fact that the Supreme Court famously
rejected a similar distinction in connection with federal regulation of states,
characterizing this distinction as unworkable.” 109 The court there was
referring to the adoption of the “traditional governmental functions”
standard for determining state immunity from federal regulations in
National League of Cities v. Usery. 110 That standard was rejected a few
years later in Garcia v. San Antonio which characterized such an approach
as unsound and unworkable. 111
2. Criticisms of the Approach.
a. Questioning the Relevancy and Understanding of Montana’s Consensual
Relations Exception.
Although this Article takes the position that the Soaring Eagle
“Montana framework” approach is more legally coherent than the “purely
106. Id. at 673–75 (referring to NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, 788 F.3d
537 (6th Cir. 2015)).
107. Soaring Eagle Resort & Casino v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 674 (6th Cir. 2015).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 675.
110. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840–52 (1976).
111. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537–47 (1985).
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intramural aspect” or the “spectrum of sovereignty” approaches, this
approach does contain some flaws. While it claims to evaluate whether
Indian nations have enough sovereignty to preempt federal law, because the
Montana case creates a general rule of no tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers unless of the two Montana exceptions apply, the approach in
effect creates a rebuttable presumption that Congress always intends a
federal law to apply to Indian nations inside their reservations if such law
has the potential to impact a substantial number of non-tribal members.
The Soaring Eagle approach could also result in a conundrum if the
consensual exception was found not available to establish tribal jurisdiction
over non-members. Although there is no question that application of the
federal law to tribal regulations of its own members would intrude on tribal
sovereignty, the reality is that it would not be politically, and perhaps even
legally, feasible to have the non-member workforce covered under the
NLRA and be allowed to join a union while the tribal workforce would
have to remain unorganized. The same thing would probably be true for just
about any of the general federal laws regulating the workplace, whether it
be the FLSA or OSHA.
Another problem in relying on the Montana framework is that the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in applying the Montana consensual
exception is a work in progress. As of now, for instance, there are no
Supreme Court precedents which actually extend application of the
Montana general rule (no tribal jurisdiction over non-members) to
consensual relations involving activities of non-Indians on Indian owned
lands within Indian reservations. Nevada v. Hicks extended Montana to all
lands within Indian reservations but the case involved a very peculiar
situation, extension of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over state game
wardens, 112 and the claim of tribal jurisdiction was based on the selfgovernance exception. Furthermore, the Court was hopelessly fractured
over the importance land ownership status should have concerning the
Montana exceptions. 113 In addition, Justice Scalia in his Hicks plurality
opinion went out of his way to first rule that the state did have jurisdiction
to investigate the crime in question which had been committed off the
reservation. Implicit in this finding was that the tribe had lost the right to
112. Nevanda v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001).
113. Three Justices took the position that land ownership played some role in the
determination of tribal jurisdiction, three Justices took the position that land status was not a
jurisdictional factor, and three Justices thought it was a very important factor. Finally,
Justice Ginsburg took the position that Strate should be limited to cases involving assertion
of tribal jurisdiction over state officers performing official duties on Indian reservations.
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exclude these state game wardens as long as they were performing their
official duties. Consistent with this statement, some lower courts as well as
scholars have taken the position that the Montana rule should not even be
applicable to lands over which the tribe has retained the treaty right to
exclude. 114
The consensual relations exception first came into play at the Supreme
Court in Strate v. A-1 Contractors where a non-Indian plaintiff was suing a
non-Indian corporation in tribal court over a fender bender type traffic
accident that occurred on the reservation. 115 One of the plaintiff’s
arguments was that the tribal court had jurisdiction because the defendant
had a contract with the tribe to perform some work on the reservation. The
Court did not agree, stating that the highway accident at issue presented “no
‘consensual relationship’ of the qualifying kind.” 116 The Court concluded
that the contract was irrelevant here because it was between the defendant
and the tribe and not with the plaintiff. The Court also examined the cases
Montana listed as supporting the consensual exception. One involved a
dispute over a sale transaction between a tribal member and a non-Indian
trader. 117 The other three all dealt with tribal taxes on non-Indians
conducting business on the reservation. 118
The consensual relations exception also came into play in Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley where the non-Indian hotel operator was challenging
a hotel occupancy tax imposed by the Navajo Nation. 119 Stating that
“Montana’s consensual relationship exception requires that the tax or
regulation imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual
relationship itself,” 120 the Court concluded that a nonmember’s receipt of
police, fire, and medical services from the tribe “does not create the
requisite connection,” 121 and neither did the fact that the nonmember had a
federal license to be an “Indian trader” on the reservation.

114. Water Wheel Camp Rec. Area Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2011);
Judith V. Royster, Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers on Trust Lands, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming).
115. Strate v. A-1 Contrs., 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997).
116. Id.
117. See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
118. The tribal taxes involved were on non-Indians grazing cattle, conducting business,
or buying cigarettes from Indian vendors.
119. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649 (2001).
120. Id. at 656.
121. Id. at 655.
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Reliance on Montana’s consensual relations exception has also
become more problematic because in its latest foray into the intricacies of
the implicit divestiture doctrine, the Supreme Court seemed to have cast a
doubt on the prevailing understanding of the exception. 122 Thus, In Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch, 123 the Supreme Court came up with
a new twist in interpreting the consensual relations exception. The Court
refused to apply the exception to allow tribal court jurisdiction over a
lawsuit filed by tribal member against a non-Indian bank which alleged that
the bank had discriminated against tribal members who wanted to purchase
land located on the reservation but owned in fee by the bank. The tribal
members alleged that the bank offered much more favorable terms to nonIndians as it did to them. The Court first stated that Indian tribal courts lack
jurisdiction in this case because “the Tribe lacks the civil authority to
regulate the Bank’s sale of its fee land.” 124
Addressing Montana’s first exception, the Court stated that Montana
only permits “tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation
that implicates the tribe’s sovereign interests.” 125 Thus, the Court seemed to
imply that a tribe can only regulate the activities or conduct of nonmembers pursuant to the consensual relations exception, “to the extent
necessary to protect tribal self-government and to control internal
relations.” 126 In this case, the Court found that the sale of non-Indian fee
land could not be “justified by reference to the tribe’s sovereign
interests,” 127 because “fee land owned by nonmembers has already been
removed from the tribe’s immediate control.” 128 While tribes may not be
able to order the sale of non-Indian fee land, the Supreme Court has held
that tribes can zone non-member fee lands under certain circumstances. 129
So, it was not quite accurate for the Court to state that tribal sovereign
interests can never be affected when non-Indian fee lands are involved

122. M. Gatsby Miller, Note, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory
Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1825 (2014).
123. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330
(2008).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 333.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 336.
128. Id. at 330.
129. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408,
431 (1989).
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because tribes have no power to control non-member fee lands. 130 Besides,
as argued by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, while under the Court’s rationale,
the tribal court could not have ordered the sale of the land to tribal
members, nothing in the Court’s reasoning should have prevented it from
holding that the tribal court could still assess financial damages based on
the discrimination claim since this remedy did not involve the forced sale of
nonmember fee land. 131
This latest twist concerning the limits of the consensual relations
exception may be at play in the next Indian case to be decided by the
Supreme Court since certiorari was recently granted to a case out of the
Fifth Circuit, Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw. 132 In the
case, Dollar General filed suit in federal court to enjoin John Doe, a
member of the tribe, from adjudicating a tort claim against the corporation
in tribal court. John Doe, a thirteen year boy, alleged that the manager of
the Dollar General store had sexually molested him when he was working
there as an unpaid intern pursuant to a tribal educational program. 133 Dollar
General was leasing the land where the store was located from the tribe and
had agreed with the tribe to participate in the Tribal Youth Opportunity
Program under which John Doe was placed as an intern in its store. The
Fifth Circuit upheld tribal jurisdiction pursuant to the consensual relations
exception. Although the court observed that the consensual relation did not
have to be strictly commercial to qualify under the Montana exception, it
concluded that the consensual relationship here was “unquestionably of a
commercial nature.” 134 The court also found that there was an obvious
nexus to Dollar General’s participation in the tribal program since the
wrong alleged to have been perpetrated by Dollar General was placing a

130. Unless the word “immediate” which qualified the word “control” was used to
distinguish a tribe ordering a “sale” of non-Indian fee land from a tribe just “zoning” such
lands. Thus, later in the opinion Justice Roberts did acknowledge that the tribe “may
legitimately seek to protect its members from noxious use that threaten tribal welfare or
security,” However, he judiciously omitted to comment on how the tribe could go about
doing this. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 330, 336
(2008).
131. Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 350–52.
132. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014),
cert. granted, (No. 13-1496), Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw, 135 S. Ct.
2833 (June 15, 2015) (case argued December 1, 2015).
133. Liability of Dollar General was alleged pursuant to vicarious liability and
negligent hiring, training, and supervision of employees.
134. Dolgencorp, 746 F.3d at 173 (ruling that the relation did not have to be strictly
“commercial”).
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manager who sexually assaulted John Doe in a store located on tribal
land. 135 Concerning the impact of Justice Roberts language in Plains
Commerce, after first mentioning that it was only dicta, the court stated,
“[w]e do not interpret Plains Commerce to require an additional showing
that one specific relationship, in itself, intrude[s] on the internal relations of
the tribe or threaten[s] self-rule.” 136 The court also added that, in any case,
“the ability to regulate the working conditions (particularly as pertains to
health and safety) of tribe members employed on reservation land is plainly
central to the tribe’s power of self-government.” 137
Since the Court decided Plains Commerce, no federal court of appeals
has interpreted the case as modifying Montana’s consensual exception. 138
The upcoming Dollar General decision should, however, lead the Supreme
Court to evaluate the normative justifications for the consensual relations
exception to the Montana general rule since Dollar General will no doubt
argue that unless the exercise of tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember
pursuant to a consensual relation is tied to tribal self-government, there are
no normative justifications. It is true that the Montana court started its
argument by stating that the “exercise of tribal power beyond what is
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of tribes.” 139 Following Dollar
General’s reasoning, the consensual relations exception to the general rule
of “no tribal jurisdiction” should therefore be either tied to tribal selfgovernment or internal relations.
There are two principal arguments to rebut this position. First, it can be
argued that when it created that exception, the Montana court itself
implicitly acknowledged that tribal jurisdiction over disputes with a nexus
to commercial consensual relations was indeed essential to tribal selfgovernment or part of internal relations. Secondly, one can argue that the
requirement of a nexus between the consensual agreement and tribal
jurisdiction is there because for some Justices, the principal normative
135. Dollar General also argued that its alleged negligence, the training and selection of
the manager, did not take place on the reservation but the court refused to address the issue
since it was not raised in either the tribal or federal district court. Id. at 173–74.
136. Id. at 175.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Dish Network Service v. Laducer, 725 F.3d 877 (8th Cir. 2013); Att’ys
Process & Investigation Servs. v. Sac & Fox Tribe, 609 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2010); Water
Wheel Camp v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 2011). One federal district court did take
the position advocated by the defendant in Dollar General, see Rolling Frito-Lay Sales L.P.
v. Stover, CV 11-1361-PHX-FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9555, at *14 (D. Ariz. 2012).
139. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
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argument against tribal jurisdiction over non-members is that they have not
consented to tribal jurisdiction and such jurisdiction without consent runs
against one of the basic foundations of the American political system which
is the principle of “the consent of the governed.” 140 Thus, in holding that
Indian tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, Justice
Kennedy once stated, “[t]he retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a
recognition of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians
who consent to be tribal members.” 141 However, while in the field of
criminal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy took the position that consent may
only be inferred through membership, it can be argued that in the civil
context, the Montana court recognized that nonmembers with such
consensual agreements have implicitly consented to tribal regulation tied to
such contracts and agreements.
b. A Better Implicit Divestiture Approach?
In an earlier work, I had suggested that if one was going to determine
applicability of a silent general federal law to Indian nations by reference to
the implicit divestiture doctrine or, in other words, the amount of retained
sovereignty still possessed by Indian nations, a possible approach would be
to use the implicit divestiture doctrine as originally conceived and
formulated by Justice Rehnquist in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 142
In Oliphant, the Court held that when it came to assertion of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-members, it was inconsistent with the status of Indian
tribes to exercise inherent sovereign powers in a fashion that was in conflict
with the overriding sovereign interest of the United States. 143 The Oliphant
Court determined that such tribal jurisdiction was in conflict with an
overriding federal interest because
from the formation of the Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
the United States has manifested a . . . great solicitude that its citizens be
protected by the United Sates from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty . . . . By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the
United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give their power to try

140. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, J.) (“The
Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the governed.”).
141. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990).
142. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). For further
discussion see Skibine, supra note 49, at 126–30 (1991).
143. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 209.

148

21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 123 (2016)
non-Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable
to Congress. 144

Although the Court did not actually state specifically why tribal
prosecutions could result in such unwarranted intrusions into personal
liberty, it seems that the Court was concerned about the fact that under
previous Supreme Court precedents, Indian tribes were not bound by the
Constitution. 145 Thus, if the tribes had criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, it was possible that they could decide to prosecute such nonmembers without the full protections of the Bill of Rights. 146
Nowadays, although the Montana framework has supplanted the
Oliphant methodology when it comes to determining tribal civil jurisdiction
over non-members, 147 it could also be argued that the Oliphant
methodology can still be used if application of the Montana framework
would be awkward or inappropriate. Because the issue here is to determine
whether Congress intended the law to apply to Indian nations, taking into
account the existence of an overriding national interest to have the law
apply is definitely more appropriate than making this decision by reference
to whether tribes have jurisdiction over non-members under the Montana
framework as was done in the Soaring Eagle Casino case. 148 Because the
very concept of an “overriding” sovereign interest implies a balancing or

144. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
145. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–85 (1896).
146. Thus, the Court mentioned that even though Congress was careful to extend basic
criminal rights to all non-Indians being prosecuted in federal courts for crimes committed in
Indian country, “under respondent’s theory, however, Indian tribes would have been free to
try the same non-Indians without these careful proceedings.” Id. at 1022.
147. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 111–36 and accompanying text. When Justice Rehnquist first
came up with his Oliphant test to implicitly divest Indian tribes of criminal jurisdiction over
non-members, he never indicated that such test was limited to matters of criminal
jurisdiction. It is only after the test was unsuccessfully invoked in 1980 in an effort to
prevent Indian tribes from taxing non-members buying cigarettes on Indian reservations, that
the Court radically altered the Oliphant test in Montana. Thus, in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, the Court stated,
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribe’s dependent
status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of
tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the
National Government . . . In the present cases, we can see no overriding federal
interest that would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation.
447 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1980).
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comparison with other interests, i.e. the tribal interests, 149 I suggested that
in determining whether there was an overriding federal interest to apply
general federal regulatory laws to Indian nations inside Indian reservations,
there should be a balancing between the federal interests in applying the
law to Indian nations and the interest of those nations in being governed by
their own tribal law. 150 Furthermore, the importance of the federal interest
should be determined by whether the application of the general law to
Indian nations inside the reservations was necessary to achieve the purpose
and implementation of the law outside the reservations. In other words,
would a tribal exemption from the law inside the reservations have a
substantial negative impact on the implementation of the law outside Indian
reservations? 151
C. Silence as a Presumption of Non-Applicability.
1. The Tenth Circuit “Intent to Preempt” Approach.
Faced with the same issue as the D.C., Ninth, and Sixth Circuits, the
Tenth Circuit in NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 152 phrased the issue as
follows: “the central question here is whether the Pueblo continues to
exercise the same authority to enact right-to-work laws as do states and
territories, or whether Congress in enacting §§ 8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the
NLRA, intended to strip Indian tribal governments of this authority as a
sovereign.” 153 The tribal ordinance in this case was prohibiting employers
and unions from entering into agreements requiring employees to belong to
a union. The court also mentioned that the district court “took pains to point
out, namely, that the general applicability of federal labor law is not at
issue.” 154 While this sentence may lead some to erroneously believe that the
case did not involve the application of laws of general applicability to
Indian tribes, the court was only citing to a sentence in the district court
149. The Oliphant Court just assumed, however, that the federal interest in protecting
its citizens from unwarranted intrusion into their liberty was overriding without actually
doing any balancing with the tribal interests at stake. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism
and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. IND. L. REV. 391, 397–98 (2007–
2008).
150. Skibine, supra note 49, at 128.
151. Id. at 129.
152. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2002).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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opinion which stated that the question was not whether the NLRA was
applicable to a private employer doing business on an Indian reservation
but whether the private employer was also bound by the laws of the
Pueblo. 155
The court announced that its analysis would be guided by the
following principle:
The burden falls on the NLRB and the Union, as plaintiffs attacking the
exercise of sovereign tribal power, “to show that it has been modified,
conditioned or divested by Congressional action . . . ambiguities in
federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with
tribal notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging
tribal independence.” 156

The court also reiterated that “a well-established canon of Indian law is that
doubtful expressions of legislative intent must be resolved in favor of the
Indians.” 157 Perhaps more controversial, the court also asserted that, “[t]he
canon applies to other statutes, even where they do not mention Indians at
all.” 158
Having determined that the NLRB had the burden to demonstrate a
congressional intent to preempt the exercise of tribal sovereign power, the
court found that enactment of such right-to-work ordinance was part of the
Pueblo’s sovereign powers because “[i]n addition to broad authority over
intramural matters such as membership, tribes retain sovereign authority to
regulate economic activity within their territory.” 159 The court did mention
that under Montana, the tribe was divested of some inherent sovereign
powers over non-members, but it concluded that,
These limiting precedents, however, are not applicable here, where the
NLRB seeks a declaratory judgment prohibiting the application of the
ordinance to all persons everywhere on the reservation, and where the
only instance of regulation cited pertains to consensual commercial
dealings between the Pueblo and its members on the one hand, and a
lumber company operating on lands leased from the tribe on the
other. 160

155.
156.
157.
158.

NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1351–52 (D.N.M. 1998).
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1191.
NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989)).
159. Id. at 1192.
160. Id. at 1193.
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In Part II.B. of its opinion, the court explained why the burden to show
a congressional intent to preempt should be on the NLRB, and why the
Indian canons of statutory construction were applicable to a statute that was
silent concerning Indians. The court started by asserting that although
Congress can divest tribal powers, divestiture was disfavored as a matter of
national policy. The court also mentioned the existence of a trust
relationship between the United States and the tribe as well as Supreme
Court precedents that had cautioned that when tribal sovereignty was at
stake “we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative
intent.” 161 The Court also referred to the principle that there is a
presumption of non-preemption, 162 although usually, this principle is
applied only to federal preemption of state law. Finally, the court
mentioned that finding preemption of tribal law in this case would
contradict congressional policy as well as the policy of the executive
branch, which is to encourage tribal self-government. 163 Addressing the
argument made by the NLRB that there were other canons such as the
principle expresio unius est exclusion alterius, which could clarify the plain
meaning of the law as favoring preemption, the court stated, “[i]n the
context of Indian law, appeals to ‘plain language’ or ‘plain meaning’ must
give way to canons of statutory construction peculiar to Indian law.” 164
The issue in Pueblo of San Juan really came down to interpreting
congressional silence on whether the law should apply to Indian tribes
inside their reservations. Does such silence create a presumption of
applicability or not? The court resolved the question in favor of tribal
sovereignty, stating that, “[s]ilence is not sufficient to establish
congressional intent to strip Indian tribes of their retained inherent authority
to govern their own territory. The correct presumption is that silence does
not work a divestiture of tribal power.” 165 Noting that the section of the law
at stake here did not preempt the states from enacting such right-to-work
laws but reaffirmed their existing authority, the court stated “Congress’
silence as to the tribes can therefore hardly be taken as an affirmative
divestment of their existing general authority as sovereigns to control

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 1195 (quoting from Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
Id.
NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1196.
See id. at 1196 (“[T]he proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign
power to tax remains intact.” (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148
n.14 (1982))).
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economic activity.” 166 The same attitude towards legislative silence was
recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit in a decision examining whether what
the court referred to as “legislative void” evidenced a congressional intent
to divest the tribes of jurisdiction over their own members committing
crimes outside Indian reservations. 167 The Sixth Circuit concluded that in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bay Mills, “congressional silence
in matters of tribal sovereignty is more aptly viewed as congressional
deference to tribal sovereignty.” 168
2. Judge Murphy’s Dissent.
Judge Murphy penned a lengthy dissent asserting that Congress can
abrogate tribal sovereign rights by implication and espousing the Coeur
d’Alene approach. He also accused the majority of disregarding the fact that
previous Tenth Circuit opinions had explicitly adopted the Coeur d’Alene
approach. However, a closer reading of the three cases cited by Judge
Murphy reveals that these cases are not that clear on this issue. In Nero v.
Cherokee Nation, 169 after noting that a previous Tenth Circuit opinion had
questioned the validity of the Tuscarora dictum after the Supreme Court
decision in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 170 the Nero court only
mentioned that other lower court had adopted the Coeur d’Alene
approach. 171 The court did conclude, however, that application of the
federal statute in this case would interfere with purely internal matters of
self-government. 172 The second case mentioned by Judge Murphy, EEOC v.
Cherokee Nation, 173 only mentioned Tuscarora and Coeur d’Alene in a
footnote and only for the proposition that some of the principles enunciated
in these cases were not applicable to a case like this one where treaty rights
were being impacted. 174
166. Part III of the court’s decision explains why the Tuscarora dictum, if applicable at
all, should be limited to regulations of Indian property and should not be applied to tribal
exercise of sovereign power. Id. at 1198.
167. Kelsey v. Pope, 809 F.3d 849, 862 (6th Cir. 2016).
168. Id. at 863.
169. Nero v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 892 F.2d 1457, 1462 (10th Cir. 1989).
170. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
171. Nero, 892 F.2d at 1462–63.
172. Id. at 1463.
173. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
174. Id. at n.3.
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Judge Murphy also relied on Phillips Petroleum v. EPA, 175 where the
issue was the applicability of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) inside
the Osage Indian reservation. Notably, Judge Murphy took the majority to
task for only distinguishing that case based on the fact that in Phillips
Petroleum, the Osage Nation did not object to application of the SDWA. 176
The reality is actually more complicated. The Phillips Petroleum court
relied primarily on its finding that Congress specifically intended the law to
apply to Indians. The court first noted that the definition section of the
SDWA refers directly to Indian tribal organizations in defining
municipality. 177 After looking at the text of the statute the court analyzed
the “context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which
the words were employed,” 178 in order to back its finding that the legislative
history reflected the fact that, “[i]n adopting the SDWA, Congress
expressly stated its concern that Indians should enjoy the benefits of clean
water drinking, as should all Americans.”179 It is only to back up its
conclusion that the court at last mentioned that application of the SDWA
here was also consistent with the Tuscarora principle. 180 It is true that the
Phillips Petroleum court did not directly address whether application of the
SDWA should be precluded because it generally interfered with the
sovereignty of the Osage Nation. However, because the Osage Nation
wanted the Act to apply, there was no one to make this argument on appeal.
Judge Murphy’s criticisms aside, the Tenth Circuit has more recently
reaffirmed the position first adopted in Pueblo of San Juan in Dobbs v.
Anthem Blue Cross. 181 The court stated, “In this circuit, respect for Indian
sovereignty means that federal regulatory schemes do not apply to tribal
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986).
871 F.2d at 1203.
803 F.2d at 554.
Id.
Id. at 555. The court backed its statement by quoting from a congressional
committee report service which noted that there were existing government programs for
Indians but that, “[I]n the Committee's view these grant programs to construct drinking water
supply systems are not necessarily adequate to assure that safe drinking water will be
available [to Indians], even from those systems which are constructed with such aid.” Id.
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6462).
180. Although the court acknowledged that the Tuscarora rule “can be rescinded where
a tribe raises a specific right under a treaty or statute which is in conflict with the general law
to be applied,” the court found that this case did not involve any such statutory or treaty
right. Id. at 557.
181. Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1283 (10th Cir.
2010).
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governments exercising their sovereign authority absent express
congressional authorization.” 182 After acknowledging that applying federal
regulatory laws to Indian tribes could interfere with tribal sovereignty, the
court stated,
For this reason, ERISA would not apply to insurance plans purchased by
tribes for employees primarily engaged in governmental functions
unless Congress expressly or necessarily preempted Indian tribal
sovereignty. Applying ERISA to such plans would prevent tribal
governments from purchasing insurance plans for governmental
employees in the same manner as other government entities, thus
treating tribal governments as a kind of inferior sovereign. We do not
assume Congress intended to infringe on Indian tribal sovereignty in this
manner absent an express statement or strong evidence of congressional
intent. 183

3. Concluding Comments on the Various Approaches Adopted in the
Circuits.
In conclusion, both the Ninth Circuit’s “purely intramural aspects” as
well as the D.C. Circuit’s “spectrum of sovereignty” approaches consider
silence as creating a presumption of applicability and refuse to require clear
indication of congressional intent unless the application of the law to Indian
nations would impose an undue interference on peculiar “aspects” of tribal
sovereignty. While the Soaring Eagle “Montana framework” approach
claims to just ask whether the Indian nations have enough sovereignty to
preempt application of the general federal law, its practical impact is to
impose a presumption that Congress always intends a federal law impacting
non tribal members to be applicable to Indian nations even on Indian
reservations. Unlike the first three approaches which ask either whether
tribal sovereignty is being interfered with “enough” or whether the tribes
have “enough” sovereignty to preempt federal law, the Tenth Circuit rightly
assumes that most if not all applications of a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme to Indian nations will interfere with tribal sovereignty.
Legislative silence concerning Indian nations in this area, therefore, creates
a presumption that the law should not be applicable to Indian nations. The
key question is not, therefore, whether the general federal laws unduly
182. See id. at 1283–84 (“Although our early cases relied in part on treaties that
expressly protected Indian tribes' sovereignty, we later recognized that a treaty was not a
necessary prerequisite to exemption.”).
183. Id. at 1284.
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interferes with tribal sovereign rights or whether the tribes have enough
sovereignty to preempt federal law but whether Congress intended to
preempt tribal sovereign rights when enacting these general federal laws.
The answer to that question turns on the current assumptions and
understandings concerning how clear Congress needs to be in order to
interfere with tribal sovereignty. In the next Part, I explain why the
methodology used in Pueblo of San Juan by the Tenth Circuit is more
consistent with “practical reasoning” and better reasoned than the
methodology used by the other circuits.
III. Interpreting Silence Under Practical Reasoning.
A. Practical Reasoning.
As stated in the introduction, this article takes the position that
resolving the ambiguity created by the lack of any reference to Indian tribes
in some of the federal regulatory laws of general applicability should be
resolved according to “practical reasoning”, a theory put forth by Professors
Frickey and Eskridge. 184 Philip Frickey once stated that under practical
reasoning “the interpreter consults all potentially relevant sources of
statutory meaning. These sources include statutory text, legislative
expectations, statutory purposes, evolution of the statute over time, and
coherence of the statute with the broader public law.” 185 Frickey and
Eskridge explained that their methodology could be visualized as a “funnel
of abstraction.” 186 In that funnel, the statutory interpreter starts with more
concrete factors such as text, legal precedent, legislative history, and
statutory purpose, before moving on to more abstract factors such as
evolutive considerations, and reconciliation of the interpretation with
current public norms. When it comes to interpreting statutes in federal
Indian law, Professor Frickey’s practical reasoning approach begins with a
“heightened concern for context,” 187 followed by a “critical assessment of

184.
185.
186.
187.

See supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
Frickey, supra note 32, at 1208.
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 25, at 353.
Frickey, supra note 32 at 1220. Frickey further explained that practical reasoning
Attacks legal problems from a contextual framework—from the ground up
rather than by a descending inquiry from conceptual formal theory. Although
difficult to define, practical reason includes a concern for history and context; a
desire to avoid abstracting away the human component in judicial decision-
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traditions and preunderstanding, and fusion of horizons.” 188 Frickey and
Eskridge borrowed the term “fusion of horizons” from Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s theory of hermeneutics for interpreting text. 189 According to this
theory, “[t]he historical text contains assumptions and ‘preunderstanding’ a
‘horizon which is often quite different from the “horizon” of the later
interpreter.’” 190 Thus, interpretation should be viewed “as an effort to seek
common ground between the two often distant horizons.” 191
Last but not least, as once put by Professor Frickey, “it is essential to
note what practical reasoning in federal Indian law is not. It is not blind
acceptance of the Indian position in a case. Indeed, an appreciation for
context, a critical assessment of asserted preunderstandings, and a fusing of
horizons may work against Indian advocates in some circumstances.” 192 In
the next sections, after first considering text, purpose and congressional
intent, the so-called foundational theories of statutory interpretation, I move
to more contextual considerations such as the traditional understanding of
tribal sovereignty, before ending with evolutive considerations.
B. Foundational Considerations: Text, Purpose, and Congressional Intent.
In the case of statutes silent about Indians, Indian nations could be
included if the statute contained specific text to the effect that, “This Act
shall be applied to absolutely everyone, located anywhere within the
territorial borders of the United States.” This can explain why reservation
Indians are covered for most purposes under general federal tax laws.193
making; an appreciation of the complexity of life; some faith in dialogue and
deliberation; a tolerance of ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a
skepticism of rigid dichotomies . . . One significant consequence of thinking
about interpretation in this way is that statutes have a dynamic quality; they can
mean different things over time and across contexts and interpreters.
Id. at 1208.
188. Id. at 1231.
189. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 25, at 346 (citing to Hans-Georg Gadamer theory
of philosophical hermeneutics).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Frickey, supra note 32, at 1237.
193. See, e.g., The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870); Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. United States, 319 U.S. 598, 606 (1943) (explaining that revenue laws are
extended over Indian territories where they are exempt in other respects). See also United
States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939) (“Exemptions from taxation do not
rest on implications.”).
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Inclusion can also be predicated on legislative history reflecting a
congressional intent that tribes be covered by the legislation. 194 Finally,
inclusion could also arguably be derived from the structure or purpose of
the statute in cases where, for instance, excluding Indian nations would
either make key provisions of the law unenforceable or defeat the very
purpose of the law. This could help explain the inclusion of reservation
Indians for the purpose of federal criminal laws applicable to anyone within
the United States. 195 In most cases, however, such arguments will not be
available or convincing in arguing for inclusion of Indian nations within
general federal regulatory statutes.
C. Contextual Considerations: Historical Assumptions and Understanding
About Tribal Sovereignty and Statutes Abrogating that Sovereignty.
The relevant “context” here is the place of Indian nations within the
legal and political system of the United States as well as the exercise of
tribal sovereign powers which may conflict with the requirements mandated
in some of the general federal regulatory laws. “Context” for the purpose of
practical reasoning can be both the historical context as well as the current
one. So on one hand, one can look at the historical context concerning the
position of Indian nations at the time the legislation was enacted. Under this
analysis, one would analyze what the legislators thought about Indian
nations at the time the statute was enacted. On the other, one should also
look at the current political and legal context. Here, one would look at the
current understanding of the place of Indian nations within our legal and
political system. Because Professor Frickey once wrote that “practical
reason asks the questions relevant to understanding and reconstructing the
legal treatment of tribal Indians as they are situated today,” 196 it would
seem that while the historical context at time of passage is certainly not
irrelevant, the current political and legal understanding of Indian nations as
they are today is more important.
It seems clear that the assumptions and understandings of legislators
before 1870 was that Indian nations were outside the political system of the
194. Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986); see also notes 175–80 for
further discussion.
195. See United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying the
Organized Crime Control Act to illegal gambling conducted by Indians inside an Indian
reservation).
196. Frickey, supra note 32, at 1240.
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United States and therefore congressional legislation did not include them
unless they were specifically mentioned. 197 That was because until 1871,
the United States related with tribes mostly by signing treaties with them. 198
However, legislation enacted during the Allotment Era could arguably carry
the opposite understanding since the purpose of the policy was to assimilate
Indians into the mainstream of American society. 199 However, the
Allotment Era ended in the late 1920s. It seems that most of the federal
regulatory acts at issue in this article can be described as labor legislation
enacted in the wake of the New Deal. As such they are contemporaries to
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). 200 The IRA put an end to the
Allotment Era and endorsed a policy of government to government with
Indian tribes. 201 One of IRA’s principal policy was the revitalization of
tribal governments. 202 Thus, it can be assumed that the New Deal Congress
was in favor of protecting and promoting tribal self-government. It is highly
unlikely, therefore, that such Congress would have interfered with tribal
sovereign rights in such an underhanded manner as imposing a federal
regulatory regime preempting tribal power without so much as mentioning
Indian nations in such legislation.
Part of the historical “assumptions and understandings” concerning
interpretation of statutes affecting the rights of Indian nations are the
various canons of statutory interpretations that are peculiar to the field of
federal Indian law. 203 One of them is that treaties and statutes are to be
197. See generally Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 122–23 (1884) (holding that unlike
others non-citizens born in the United States, such as African American slaves, the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution did not make Indians born on Indian reservations
citizens).
198. See Act of March 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 263 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71
(2012) (prohibiting the making of any further treaties with Indian nations).
199. The Allotment Era started around 1871, the year Congress enacted a law putting
an end to treaty making with Indian tribes (16 Stat. 544, codified at 25 U.S.C. 71), but it
went into full force with the enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as
the Dawes Act. The purpose of the Act was to break up the tribally owned land base by
giving an 80 to 160-acre allotment to every member of the tribe and selling the remaining
lands on the reservation to non-Indians through the Homestead Acts. For further analysis,
see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 (1995).
200. Also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984–88, codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. §§ 452–454 (2012).
201. For more background information on the IRA, see Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal
Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 189 (2001).
202. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 79–84 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds., 2012).
203. See Frickey, supra note 32, at 1228 (“In practical reasoning, canons can serve a
critical interpretive role. They constitute a shorthand method of identifying the relevant
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liberally construed with ambiguous provisions construed to the Indians’
benefit. 204 This canon was initially only applied to treaty interpretation but
was later extended to statutes affecting or dealing with Indians. 205 As
mentioned above, the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of San Juan applied this
Indian canon of statutory interpretation to a statute that was not enacted
with Indians in mind, let alone enacted for their particular benefit.206 The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the Indian canons could
be applied beyond Indian-specific statutes because most cases involve with
statute specifically enacted for the benefit of Indians or for the regulation of
Indian affairs. Furthermore, in many cases, the Court avoids the issue
altogether by not finding any ambiguity generating the use of the canons,
when in fact ambiguity there was. 207 In a thorough and comprehensive
article, Professor Bryan Wildenthal made some convincing arguments why
the Indian canons should apply to federal laws of general applicability. 208
Among other things, he noted that at least three Supreme Court cases, Iowa
Mutual v. LaPlante, 209 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 210 and United
States v. Dion, 211 had applied such canons to laws of general applicability.
The Court has many times endorsed the statement that the Indian
canons were “rooted in the unique trust relationship between the United
states and the Indians.” 212 So perhaps, the more cogent argument against
applying the Indian canons to general federal statutes is that if the reason
for the canons is the existence of a trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian nations, the canons should only be applied to statutes

public law tradition.”).
204. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (pointing out
that one of the canons of statutory interpretation of Indian law is that statutes are to be
liberally construed in favor of Indians).
205. See Yakima v. Confederated Tribes, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992) (restating the
deeply rooted principle that statutes should be construed liberally in favor of Indians).
206. For the opposite view see San Manuel Bingo v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1312
(2007) (refusing to apply the Indian canons to federal statutes of general applicability).
207. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001) (interpreting
IGRA as clearly allowing federal taxation of some tribal gaming over a forceful dissent by
Justice O’Connor who would have applied the Indian canons).
208. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Federal Labor Laws, Indian Sovereignty, and the Canons of
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. 413 (2007).
209. 480 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987).
210. 455 U.S. 139, 149–52 (1982).
211. 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).
212. Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985); Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
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enacted pursuant to that trust relationship. In other words, the canons
should only be applicable to statutes enacted for the benefit of Indian tribes
or concerning the regulation of Indian affairs. The mistake in this
conclusion has its roots in an erroneous or simplistic understanding about
the nature of the trust responsibility.
As originally conceived by Chief Justice Marshall, the ultimate reason
for the trust, and therefore the Indian canons, is not the protection of
individual Indians as incompetent wards of the government. 213 The reason
for the trust is the protection of Indian nations as domestic dependent
nations. 214 Because the Indian canons are derived from the trust, the reason
for their existence, therefore, is the protection of the right of these domestic
dependent Indian nations to exercise their sovereign rights of selfgovernment. Thus, no one would argue that the Indian canons should be
applicable to all general federal laws such as a general criminal statute
being applied to individual Indians or to a statute with no implications for
tribal self-government, such as for instance, a statute governing how anyone
should go about doing business with the Defense Department. However, a
general federal statute silently preempting the exercise of tribal sovereign
rights is another matter.

213. This later understanding of the trust doctrine was introduced during the Allotment
Era. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28, 45 (1913) (bringing up the question of whether the United States should treat Indians as
wards).
214. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (examining the unique
relationship between the United States government and Indian nations and noting that they
are domestic dependent nations); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (noting that
while every nation is somewhat dependent on the nations that surround it they are still
separate communities). For an eloquent argument interpreting the jurisprudence of Chief
Justice Marshall as using canons of statutory and treaty interpretation to protect tribal
sovereignty within the structure of the United States Constitution see Philip P. Frickey,
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in
Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 393–417 (1993).
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D. Evolutive Considerations and Fusion of Horizons.
1. Current Assumptions and Understanding Concerning Abrogation of
Inherent Tribal Sovereignty.
a. Current Congressional Policies.
One could argue that the last piece of congressional legislation which
abrogated some inherent powers possessed by Indian tribes was the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, since the Act mandated application of most of the
rights contained in the Bill of Rights to tribal governments. 215 Since then,
congressional legislation has either been supportive of tribal selfgovernment, 216 or relaxed some previously imposed restrictions.217 Other
acts confirmed, 218 or even arguably expanded the sovereign powers of
Indian Tribes. 219 Some may argue that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA), 220 restricted tribal authority by mandating that tribes enter into
compacts with states before conducting casino-type gaming activities.
However, in reality, a lot of gaming activities were already prohibited or
severely restricted on Indian reservations pursuant to federal law. 221
Therefore, it can be concluded that there is absolutely nothing in the
record of Congress or congressional history which indicates that if given
215. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2012).
216. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (facilitating and encouraging tribal self-government); see also Tribal
Self-Governance Act, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (1994) (same); Indian Financing
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974) (same).
217. See Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, P.L. 111-211, Title II, 124 Stat 2261,
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (1982)
(allowing Indians to enter into agreements regarding the disposition of their mineral
resources).
218. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) (affirming tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1) (2012) (affirming Indians’ special domestic
violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons); Violence Against Women Reauthorization
Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 120 (providing, under certain conditions, tribes
criminal jurisdiction over all persons committing crimes involving domestic violence).
219. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (establishing
standards for foster care placement with the intention of not breaking up Indian families).
220. 25 U.S.C §§ 2701–2721 (2012).
221. See Robert N. Clinton, Enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988:
The Return of the Buffalo to Indian Country or Another Federal Usurpation of Tribal
Sovereignty?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 96 (2010) (pointing out that many Indians opposed IGRA
because it would curtail control but in reality federal government already controlled these
activities through other legislation).
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the choice, Congress would overwhelmingly approve legislation amending
these federal laws of general applicability to include Indian tribes, thereby
abrogating or preempting tribal powers. In fact, if Congress felt strongly
about including the tribes under these acts, it would have already amended
these acts to preempt tribal power. The fact that, with a couple of minor
exceptions, 222 it has done nothing indicates that Congress is, at best, neutral
on this issue. There have been some proposed amendments to grant Indian
tribes the same kind of exemptions enjoyed by other governmental
organizations but so far, the organized labor lobby has prevented enactment
of any such amendments. 223
b. Supreme Court Precedents.
A major criticism of the approaches adopted in all the circuits except
for the Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of San Juan is that they do not require clear
indication of congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign powers and in
doing so ignore the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning
congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign rights. As stated in a recent
Supreme Court decision: “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’
that exercise inherent sovereign authority. As dependents, the tribes are
subject to plenary control by Congress . . . and yet they remain separate
sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution. Thus, unless and until Congress
acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority.” 224
Concerning abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity from suits, the
Supreme Court continues to uphold the language in the landmark decision
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 225 to the effect that “It is settled that a
waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.” 226 That language was recently reaffirmed in Michigan v. Bay
222. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32)
(2012) (exempting only tribal agencies that conduct governmental functions); Worker
Adjustment and Retraining and Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1), (7) (2012)
(seeming to exempt all tribally operated institutions).
223. The latest effort is the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015, S. 248, which was
reported out of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on September 10, 2015. S. REP. NO.
114-140 (2015). For a description of other failed efforts see Guss, supra note 34, at 1651–
52.
224. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014).
225. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that the sovereign
immunity of the Pueblo from suit had not been abrogated in the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968).
226. Id. at 59.
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Mills, 227 where the Court held that nothing in the IGRA expressly abrogated
the tribe’s sovereign immunity for allegedly conducting gaming on nonIndian lands. 228 Therefore, the state of Michigan could not sue the tribe in
the instant case. 229 In explaining the normative reason why it adopted a
position requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to divest tribes of
sovereign immunity, the Court stated “[w]e ruled that way for a single,
simple reason: because it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not ours, to
determine whether and how to limit tribal immunity. The special brand of
sovereignty the tribes retain . . . rests in the hands of Congress.” 230
Requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to abrogate tribal
sovereign rights beyond sovereign immunity from suits was recognized in
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 231 where the Supreme Court had to
decide whether a couple of federal statutes as well as national energy
policies implicitly preempted the tribe’s ability to tax oil and gas producers
operating pursuant to tribal leases on the reservation. The Court first
remarked that the Tribe had the inherent power to impose its severance tax
pursuant to either its power of self-government or its power to exclude. 232
After quoting language from an earlier case to the effect that “a proper
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of
Congress in this area cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear
indications of legislative intent,” 233 the Court stated that “petitioners can
cite to no statute that specifically divests the Tribe of its power to impose
the severance tax on their mining activities.” 234 The Court concluded that
because it could find no “clear indications” that Congress implicitly
divested the tribe of its power to impose the tax, the Federal Government

227. 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (“The baseline position, we have often held, is tribal
immunity; and “[t]o abrogate such immunity, Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that
purpose.”) (citing C&L Enter. v. Citizen Band, 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)) (quoting Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
228. Id. at 2032–33.
229. The Court held that IGRA abrogated the tribe’s immunity for gaming conducted
illegally on Indian lands but the gaming here was not conducted on Indian lands as such
lands are defined in IGRA.
230. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2037 (2014) (emphasis
added).
231. 455 U.S. 130 (1981).
232. See id. at 137, 144 (noting that the power to tax is a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty).
233. Id. at 149 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978)).
234. Id. at 151.
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had not divested the Tribe of its inherent authority to tax mining activities
on its land. 235
Merrion was followed by Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,
where the petitioner insurance corporation argued that the grant of diversity
jurisdiction to federal courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 overrode the federal
policy requiring some lawsuits arising on lands arguably under tribal
jurisdiction to be first filed in tribal courts. 236 The Court disagreed, stating
that it did not “read the general grant of diversity jurisdiction to have
implemented such a significant intrusion on tribal sovereignty. . . . The
diversity statute makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the legislative
history suggests any intent to render inoperative the established federal
policy promoting tribal self-government.” 237
In conclusion, current Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that
clear indication of congressional intent is required before tribal sovereign
rights are interfered it. This indicates that the Tenth Circuit approach as
applied in Pueblo of San Juan is more consistent with Supreme Court
jurisprudence. In the next section I ask pragmatic questions in order to
reconcile the decision to interpret legislative silence as not abrogating tribal
sovereign rights with current public norms.
2. Reconciliation of the Interpretation with Current Public Norms.
a. Are There any Reasons to Privilege Specific “Treaty” Rights over Other
Specific Tribal Rights?
As mentioned earlier, the Coeur d’Alene court recognized a second
exception to the Tuscarora general presumption of applicability when it
stated that, “A federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the
issue of applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if . . . the
application of the law to the tribe would ‘abrogate rights guaranteed by
235. Id. at 152. The Court also commented that even if there was some “ambiguity on
this point, the doubt would benefit the Tribe, ‘[a]mbiguities in federal law have been
construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of sovereignty and
with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.’” (quoting from White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143–44 (1980)).
236. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987).
237. Id. at 17. The Court also remarked that “The original statute did not manifest a
congressional intent to limit tribal sovereignty . . . Congress has amended the diversity
statute several times since the development of tribal judicial systems, but it has never
expressed any intent to limit the civil jurisdiction of the tribal courts.” Id. at 17–18.
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treaties.’” 238 In such treaty cases, the Ninth Circuit does require the same
clear indication of congressional intent that the Tenth Circuit requires for
abrogation of any sovereign right. In this section, I argue that there are no
reasons to treat abrogation of tribal sovereign rights any differently than
abrogation of specific treaty rights. In other words, both should demand
clear indication of congressional intent.
A year after the Coeur d’Alene decision, the Supreme Court addressed
whether a general federal regulatory statute had abrogated a treaty right in
United States v. Dion. 239 The issue in Dion was whether the Eagle
Protection Act (EPA) applied to reservation Indians so as to prohibit them
from hunting eagles without complying with the EPA’s restrictions. The
Court started its analysis with the observation that,
All parties to this litigation agree that the treaty rights reserved by the
Yankton included the exclusive right to hunt and fish on their land. As a
general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on
lands reserved to them, unless such rights were clearly relinquished by
treaty or have been modified by Congress. 240

After recognizing that the Court’s cases for finding abrogation of Indian
treaty rights had at times used different language, the Court announced that,
“[w]hat is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.” 241
In Dion, the Court found such clear evidence of congressional intent from
the fact that the EPA allowed the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits
to Indians for the purpose of taking eagles for religious purposes. 242
238. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (2005). For a recent
use of the treaty exception to avoid applying a law of general applicability, see the NLRB
opinion in Chickasaw Nation, holding that a treaty clause granting the Chickasaw Nation the
right to be secure from all laws except those passed by Congress under its authority over
Indian Affairs, required clear evidence of congressional intent before the NLRA could be
applied to the tribe. 362 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 2015 WL 3526096 (2015).
239. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
240. Id. at 737–38.
241. Id. at 739–40.
242. As stated by the Court,
Congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt bald and golden
eagles is certainly strongly suggested on the face of the Eagle Protection Act.
The provision allowing taking of eagles under permit for the religious purposes
of Indian tribes is difficult to explain except as a reflection of an understanding
that the statute otherwise bans the taking of eagles by Indians, a recognition that
such a prohibition would cause hardship for the Indians, and a decision that that
problem should be solved not by exempting Indians from the coverage of the
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Since then, the question has been whether the Coeur d’Alene “treaty”
exception as supplemented by Dion’s “clear evidence” test is applicable to
all “rights” that can be implied from the creation of a reservation, or
whether such special treatment is only applicable to the abrogation of a
specific kind of treaty rights such as hunting rights. This Article takes the
position that although the Supreme Court in Dion talked in terms of a
“treaty” right to hunt, that was only because the Yankton Sioux reservation
happened to have been set aside by treaty. In fact, its holding is applicable
to all reservations, those set aside by treaties and those that are not.243 First,
the Dion Court emphasized that “These [hunting] rights need not be
expressly mentioned in the treaty.” 244 Secondly, although the Court relied
on the existence of a religious purpose exemption for Indians to find clear
evidence that Congress actually considered the treaty right and decided to
abrogate it, the legislative history the Court relied on emphasized the need
for a religious purpose exemption for tribes such as the Hopi, Zuni, and
several Pueblos in the Southwest, which in fact do not have treaties with the
United States. 245
One circuit, the Eighth, has agreed with this position even though it
has otherwise generally followed the Ninth Circuit’s intramural aspect
approach. For instance, in EEOC v. Fond du Lac, 246 where the issue was the
applicability of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act to Indian
tribes, the Eighth Circuit took the position that the Tuscarora general rule
“does not apply when the interest sought to be affected is a specific right
reserved to Indians. Specific Indian rights will not be deemed to have been
abrogated or limited absent a ‘clear and plain’ congressional intent.” 247
After first specifying that “[a]lthough the specific Indian right involved
usually is based upon a treaty, such rights may also be based upon statutes,
executive agreements, and federal common law,” 248 the Eighth Circuit
statute, but by authorizing the Secretary to issue permits to Indians where
appropriate. The legislative history of the statute supports that view.
Id. at 740.
243. Reservations can also be set aside by Executive Order or by congressional
legislation. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 190–93 (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2012).
244. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986).
245. See id. at 741–42 (noting the religious significance of the bald eagle to many
Indians).
246. 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1983).
247. Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
248. Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
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remarked that “[i]nherent in the tribe's quasi-sovereignty is the tribe's power
to make their own substantive law in internal matters and to enforce that
law in their own forums. Accordingly, the Band has the implicit right to
self-governance.” 249 The court took the position that because the Indian
tribes’ implicit right of tribal self-governance could be such a “specific
right,” whenever a general federal regulatory law interfered with tribal selfgovernment the law was not applicable to Indian tribes absent clear
evidence of congressional intent to apply it. Although sounding different,
Fond du Lac is not an outright rejection of the basic Coeur d’Alene
approach. 250 What is different about the case is that it seems to merge the
treaty right with the intramural aspect exception and in doing so, allows
“specific rights” to tribal self-government to be treated as if they were
specific treaty rights under Coeur d’Alene. Thus, under Fond du Lac,
interference with the specific right of tribal self-government, even if that
right is not specifically mentioned in a treaty, would require clear indication
of congressional intent before the general federal law could be applied to
the tribe.
Much of the debate concerning interpretation of the treaty right
exception has centered on a related issue: whether a treaty reserving the
reservation “for the exclusive use” of the tribe and its members is specific
enough to come under the treaty exception. Such treaty right to “exclusive
249. Id. (citations omitted).
250. Thus, in holding that the ADEA was not applicable in this case, the Fond du Lac
court emphasized that because it was a tribal member who was suing his own tribe for age
discrimination under the ADEA “this dispute involves a strictly intramural matter.” Id. at
249. In other words, the case would have come the same way using Coeur d’Alene’s “purely
intramural” exception. The question left open in the Eighth Circuit after Fond du Lac, was
what would have happened if the person bringing the law suit under the ADEA had not been
a member of the tribe. That question was answered at least at a district court level within the
Eighth Circuit in NLRB v. Fortune Bay Resort Casino. 688 F.Supp.2d 858 (D. Minn. 2010).
The Fortune Bay court acknowledged that under Fond du Lac “unless there is clear and
plain congressional intent to the contrary, a statute that is silent about its applicability to
tribes is presumed not to apply to tribes if the statute abrogates or limits ‘specific Indian
rights.’” Id. at 867. However, the court concluded that it was “unclear in this case whether
the NLRA affects rights specifically reserved to the Band.” Id. at 869. A reading of the
opinion reveals that the district court relied heavily on the D.C. Circuit’s San Manuel
opinion as demonstrating that “facts relating to a tribal enterprise's impact on interstate
commerce, particularly where the tribal enterprise's activities involve significant numbers of
non-Indians, are relevant to the consideration of whether the NLRA applies to the tribal
enterprise.” Id. at 870. After observing that the tribal casino employed a substantial number
of non-Indians and had a substantial non-Indian customer base, the court concluded, “It
appears that Fortune Bay's ‘activities are commercial in nature—not governmental.
Moreover, the operation of a casino . . . can hardly be described as vital to the tribes' ability
to govern themselves or as an essential attribute of their sovereignty.’” Id.
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use” explicitly recognizes the tribal right to exclude non-members but it
also implicitly recognizes the lesser right to condition entry into the
reservation by regulating all those who enter the reservation. 251 The narrow
“specific” right approach seems to have originated in United States v.
Farris, 252 the same case which gave birth to the Coeur d’Alene doctrine.
After enunciating the treaty exception to the Tuscarora principle, the Farris
court stated that “[t]his rule applies only to subjects specifically covered in
treaties, such as hunting rights . . . To bring the special rule into play here,
general treaty language such as that devoting land to a tribe's ‘exclusive
use’ is not sufficient, although such language does suffice to oust state
jurisdiction.” 253
The Ninth Circuit has continued to follow this approach. For instance,
in Department of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission where the issue was the application of OSHA to a tribally
owned enterprise, 254 one of the issues was whether the tribal treaty rights
required the government to come up with clear evidence of congressional
intent to apply the law to the tribe. Because the treaty created the
reservation for the exclusive use of the tribe and specified that “nor shall
any white person be permitted to reside upon the same without the
concurrent permission of the agent and superintendent,” the Occupational
Safety and Health Commission concluded that the treaty “evidence an
intent of the parties to exclude the white man from the reservation lands for
any and all purposes except as therein enumerated.” 255 Therefore the
Commission concluded that the application of OSHA to the tribe would
infringe on the tribe’s right to exclusive use. Relying on Farris, and another
Ninth Circuit precedent, 256 the Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating,

251. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (“Nonmembers
who lawfully enter tribal lands remain subject to the tribe’s power to exclude them. The
power necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry, on continued
presence, or on reservation conduct.”); see also Kaighn Smith, Tribal Self-Determination
and Judicial Restraint, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 517–28 (2008) (discussing the authority
of Indian tribes to condition the presence of nonmembers for personal gain).
252. 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980).
253. Id. at 893.
254. See Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d
182, 183 (9th Cir. 1991) (determining whether OSHA infringed on treaty rights in the
operation of a saw mill owned and operated by the tribe).
255. Id. at 184–85.
256. See Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878, 883 (9th Cir.
1982) (applying federal tax laws to the tribe).
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on the facts before us, we do not find the conflict between the Tribe's
right of general exclusion and the limited entry necessary to enforce the
Occupational Safety and Health Act to be sufficient to bar application of
the Act to the Warm Springs mill. The conflict must be more direct to
bar the enforcement of statutes of general applicability. 257

Perhaps not surprisingly, most circuits that have favored the Ninth
Circuit’s narrow definition of tribal sovereignty to purely intramural aspects
have also adopted the restrictive “specific” right approach to the treaty
exception. Thus in Smart v. State Farm, where the issue was application of
ERISA to a healthcare center run by the Chippewa Tribe, 258 the Seventh
Circuit took the position that, “Simply because a treaty exists does not by
necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability
is not binding on an Indian Tribe.” 259 After stating, “The critical issue is
whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured
by the treaty,” 260 the court stated, “The treaties to which the Chippewa
Tribe are signatory do not delineate specific rights . . . The Chippewa
treaties simply convey land within the exclusive sovereignty of the
Tribe.” 261 More recently, the Sixth Circuit in Soaring Eagle Casino v.
NLRB, 262 after acknowledging a split between the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits on one side and the Tenth on the other, recognized that the question

257. Dep’t of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 935 F.2d 182,
186–87 (9th Cir. 1991). In a more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its narrow
specific right approach to the treaty exception and held that the treaty at issue in the case
could not prevent the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act on the reservations
because,
Here, there is nothing in the Medicine Creek Treaty directly on point discussing
employment or wages and hours. Moreover, the language regarding freeing all
slaves is not so ambiguous that it could be construed to cover the payment of
required wages. Therefore, the application of the overtime provisions of the
FLSA to a retail business such as Baby Zack's does not impact the tribe's
agreement that it would free all slaves.
Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425, 435 (2009).
258. See Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 30 (7th Cir. 1989) (presenting the
question of whether ERISA applies to a health center owned and operated by the Chippewa).
259. Id. at 934.
260. Id. at 935.
261. Id. at 935. Thus, the court concluded that there was not a “single specific treaty or
statutory right that would be affected by application of ERISA.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has
reaffirmed its “specific right” approach in a more recent case, Menominee Tribal Enterprises
v. Solis, where it held that a OSHA was applicable to a tribal enterprise located on the
reservation. 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010).
262. 791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015).
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was a close one, 263 but nevertheless concluded that a treaty right to exclude
was “insufficient to bar application of federal regulatory statutes of general
applicability,” 264 at least in the absence of a “direct conflict between a
specific right or exclusion and the entry necessary for effectuating the
statutory scheme.” 265
In a pre-Dion case decided two years after Farris, the Tenth Circuit in
Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products, 266 came up with a different take on the
treaty exception and held that OSHA was not applicable to a tribally owned
enterprise because the treaty of 1868 with the Navajo Nation provided that
only designated federal officials could enter the Navajo reservation. 267
Because applying OSHA would have allowed federal employees to enter
the reservation at will for the purpose of enforcing the statute, 268 the court
stated
The Navajo Treaty recognizes the Indian sovereignty of the Navajos and
their right of self-government . . . Application of OSHA to NFPI would
constitute abrogation of Article II of the Navajo Treaty relating to the
exclusion of non-Indians not authorized to enter upon the Navajo
Reservation. Furthermore, it would dilute the principles of tribal
sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty. 269

After asserting that, “Limitations on tribal self-government cannot be
implied from a treaty or statute; they must be expressly stated or otherwise
made clear from surrounding circumstances and legislative history,” 270 the
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

See id. at 660–61 (discussing the different approaches by the circuits).
Id.
Id.
692 F.2d 709, 710–11 (10th Cir. 1982).
Article II of the treaty, states as follows:
[T]he United States agrees that no persons except those herein so authorized to
do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents and employees of the government,
or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in
discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be
permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this
article.
Treaty with the Navaho, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
268. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 657 (a)(1) (2012)
(a) In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is
authorized (1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where
work is performed by an employee of an employer.
269. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d 709, 712 (1982).
270. Id.
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court took the position that the Supreme Court in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 271 had abrogated the Tuscarora principle. 272
The Tenth Circuit followed Navajo Forest Products in a post Dion case,
EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 273 where the issue was application of the ADEA to
the Cherokee Nation. Describing Navajo Forest Products as having also been
based on the principle that application of OSHA “would dilute the principles of
tribal sovereignty and self-government recognized in the treaty,” the court
concluded that the “the treaty-protected right of self-government” would also
be affected here. 274 As stated by the court, “The treaty's language clearly and
unequivocally recognizes tribal self-government with only two express
exceptions, neither of which is at issue in this case . . . Consequently, we hold
that ADEA is not applicable because its enforcement would directly interfere
with the Cherokee Nation's treaty-protected right of self-government.” 275
This kind of thinking was more recently reflected by Judge Helen White’s
concurring and dissenting opinion in the Soaring Eagle Casino case. 276 Relying
on the canons of Indian treaty interpretation, 277 Judge White disagreed with
271. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Merrion.
272. The court stated that
Merrion, in our view, limits or, by implication, overrules Tuscarora, at least to
the extent of the broad language relied upon by the Secretary contained in
Tuscarora that “it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a
general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their
property interests.”
Donovan, 692 F.2d at 713.
273. 871 F.2d 937, 938 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the court will follow the reasoning
in Navajo Forest Products).
274. Id. Article V of the Treaty of New Echota, December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478,
provides in part:
The United States hereby covenant and agree . . . [to] secure to the Cherokee
Nation the right by their national councils to make and carry into effect all such
laws as they may deem necessary for the government and protection of the
persons and property within their own country belonging to their people or such
persons as have connected themselves with them; provided always that they
shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the United States and such acts
of Congress as have been or may be passed regulating trade intercourse with the
Indians.
(emphasis added).
275. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d at 938.
276. See Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. NLRB, 791 F.3d 648, 675–76 (6th Cir.
2015) (White, J., concurring in part dissenting in part) (stating that the canons of
interpretation require statutes to be interpreted in the light most favorable to Indians).
277. See id. at 656 (majority opinion)
These canons include ‘(1) how the words of the treaty were understood by the
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the majority and argued that a treaty clause reserving tribal land for the
exclusive use of the tribe was precise enough to require clear indication of
congressional intent before it can be considered abrogated. 278 According to
her, the tribal members who signed a treaty giving up a huge portion of
their tribal territory “would not have understood their right to the exclusive
use, ownership, and occupancy of their remaining land to be limited, nonspecific, or subject to regulation regarding the conditions the Tribe might
impose on those it permitted to enter.” 279
In conclusion, the normative reasons for the Dion rule do not justify
requiring more specificity among treaty rights. Nor do they justify treating
abrogation of tribal sovereign rights not mentioned in treaties any different
than the ones specifically mentioned in treaties. As explained above, the
Indian canons of statutory construction are derived from the trust
responsibility the United States has towards Indian nations. 280 The
protection of tribal sovereign rights is as, if not more, essential to the
survival of Indian nations as domestic dependent nations than the protection
of specific treaty rights. 281 In the process of upholding a tribe’s inherent
sovereignty to tax non-members, the Court once remarked that the fact that
the reservation of a tribe “was established by Executive Order rather than
by treaty does not affect our analysis; the Tribe’s sovereign power is not
affected by the manner in which its reservation was created.”282 Similarly,
the fact that a tribal sovereign right was not specifically reserved in a treaty
should not affect the analysis when it comes to determining if a general
federal regulatory law should be applied to the tribe. So, one can conclude
Indians rather than their critical meaning should form the rule of
construction . . . (2) The language used in treaties with the Indians shall never be
construed to their prejudice . . . (3) Congress may abrogate Indian treaties but it
must clearly express its intent to do so.’
(internal citations omitted).
278. Id. at 676 (White, J., concurring in part dissenting in part).
279. Id.
280. See supra notes 203–14 for further discussion. On the extent and evolution of the
trust doctrine, see Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native American
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495–523 (1994).
281. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
109, 177 (1995) (“[A]ny treaties, statutes, and judicial opinions recognize the selfgovernance of Indian nations as integral to sovereignty.”).
282. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 n.1 (1982). The Court has
also stated in Arizona v. California that whether a reservation was created by treaty or
Executive Order is irrelevant when it comes to whether the reservation possessed federally
reserved water rights under the Winters doctrine. 373 U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963).
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that all “rights” possessed exclusively by Indian tribes that are implicit in
the creation of an Indian reservation require “clear evidence” of
Congressional intent under Dion before they are considered abrogated.
Inherent sovereign tribal rights to govern the reservation are such rights and
should come under the Dion principle.
One of the reasons for requiring clear evidence of congressional intent
before finding a congressional abrogation of treaty rights is that since 1903,
the Court has taken the position that Congress has plenary power to
abrogate such treaty rights. 283 In return for granting such power, the judicial
branch developed canons of treaty interpretation peculiar to the field of
federal Indian law. 284 Similarly, however, the Court has also continued to
hold that Congress has almost “plenary” authority in regulating tribal
activities within Indian reservations. 285 The Court did not have to do this
since, arguably, the only power Congress has today over Indian tribes under
the Constitution is to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.” 286 In
return for this grant of what some may call, an extra-constitutional
power, 287 the courts developed special canons of statutory construction
peculiar to the field of federal Indian law. 288 One of these canons is that in
return for allowing Congress to terminate or abrogate inherent tribal

283. See Lonewolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–56 (1903) (noting that Congress
has plenary authority over tribal relations).
284. See Phillip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 424
(1993).
285. See Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (“The central function
of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the
field of Indian affairs.”) For critical evaluations of congressional plenary power, see Nell
Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Source, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 195, 199–228 (1984) (discussing the history and implications of the plenary power
of Congress); and Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
31, 39–94 (1996) (same).
286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The power was at least implicitly recognized as early
as Worcester v. Georgia, although at that time, Congress still used the war power, and the
treaty power in addition to the Commerce Clause power. 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832). For a
comprehensive analysis about the original intent on the reach of the Indian commerce power,
see generally Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012
(2015).
287. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There is no Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 115 (2002) (“It is simply that there is no acceptable,
historically-derived, textual constitutional explanation for the exercise of any federal
authority over Indian tribes without their consent manifested through treaty.”).
288. See Frickey, supra note 284, at 424 (discussing the canons of interpretation).
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sovereign powers at will, the Court will require clear evidence that
Congress actually intended such termination. 289
b. Are There Legitimate Reasons to Treat Tribal Governmental Institutions
Differently Than Similar State, County, or Municipal Institutions?
An opinion by Judge Posner for the Seventh Circuit which refused to
apply the FLSA to a tribal law enforcement organization, 290 represents a
good example of a decision not inconsistent with practical reasoning. In
adopting what could be called a “comity” approach, Judge Posner engaged
in an innovating exercise of statutory interpretation. After remarking that
even literalists “do not interpret statutes literally when doing so would
produce a result senseless in the real world,” 291 he concluded that a literal
reading of the FLSA would create an absurd distinction between tribal
police and all other law enforcement agencies. After acknowledging that
the statutory silence concerning Indians created an ambiguity in the FLSA,
Posner stated, “We cannot think of any reason other than oversight why
Congress failed to extend the law enforcement exemptions to Indian
police . . . more important no reason has been suggested to us.” 292 After
determining that the warden-policemen of the Tribal Great Lakes Fish and
Wildlife Commission were exercising the kind of regulatory functions over
both Indians and non-Indians that was part of the “inherent sovereignty” of
the tribe, 293 the court took the position that out of notions of comity the
same exemptions available to state police departments should be extended
to tribal ones. 294 The court held that when it comes to the FLSA, “tribal
employees exercising governmental functions that when exercised by
employees of other governments are given special consideration by the Act
are exempt.” 295
289. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (finding that Congress
must make it their clear intention to intrude on tribal sovereignty); see also supra notes 203–
14 and accompanying text for discussion.
290. Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 4 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir.
1993).
291. Id. at 494.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 495.
295. Id. At first reading, one could easily believe that Judge Posner was devising a new
approach to determine the applicability of silent federal regulatory statutes to Indian tribes,
an approach one could describe as the “comity” approach. However, Judge Posner did
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It is noteworthy that this comity approach was recently endorsed by
the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs which voted in favor of reporting
the Tribal Labor Sovereignty Act of 2015 (TLSA). 296 The TLSA would
amend the National Labor Relations Act to make sure that tribes and
tribally owned businesses are treated the same under the law as other
governmental employers. The idea of comity was also recently used by
Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community.297 At issue in the case was whether Michigan could sue the
tribe for allegedly opening an illegal gaming operation on tribal fee land
located off the reservation. The tribe argued that it had sovereign immunity
from such lawsuits. Joining the majority’s ruling in favor of the tribe,
Justice Sotomayor added another reason for upholding tribal sovereign
immunity:
Principles of Comity strongly counsel in favor of continued recognition
of tribal sovereign immunity, including for off-reservation commercial
conduct . . . We have held that Tribes may not sue States in federal
court, including for commercial conduct that chiefly impacts Indian
reservations . . . As the principal dissent observes, “Comity is about one
sovereign respecting the dignity of another.” This Court would hardy
foster respect for the dignity of Tribes by allowing States to sue Tribes
for commercial activity on State lands, while prohibiting Tribes from
suing states for commercial activity on Indian lands. 298

The comity principle reflected in both Judge Posner and Justice
Sotomayor’s opinions is consistent with an argument I have made
elsewhere that Indian nations have been incorporated into the political and
legal system of the United States as governmental entities under a third
sphere of sovereignty. 299 As such, there should be a presumption that Indian
acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit in Smart v. State Farm had already adopted the Coeur
d’Alene approach but distinguished the case by stating that the employees there “were
engaged in routine activities of a commercial service character.” Id. In a later decision, Judge
Posner further confirmed his understanding that the Coeur d’Alene approach was the law in
the Seventh Circuit. See Menominee Tribal Enter. v. Solis, 601 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2010)
(stating that his previous decision in Great Lakes Fish Commission was based on Coeur
d’Alene’s “intramural aspect” exception).
296. See S. Rep. No. 114-140, at 4 (2015) (amending the NLRA to include businesses
owned and operated by Indians on Indian land).
297. See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2041 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he question whether to confer sovereign immunity is not a
matter of right but rather one of ‘comity.’).
298. Id. at 2041–42.
299. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law and the Inherent
Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 77, 102–07 (2014).
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nations are treated the same as other non-federal governmental entities
existing within the United States.
IV. Conclusion
For unknown reasons, in enacting many general federal regulatory
laws, Congress by its silence failed to indicate whether the activities of
Indian nations inside their own reservations should be covered under such
legislation. In deciding whether such laws should include Indian nations,
most courts have used an unjustified presumption to include them but have
made exceptions when application of the law inside Indian reservations
would interfere with certain aspects of tribal sovereignty or “specific” tribal
treaty rights. After criticizing the various approaches developed in the
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, this Article has advocated using
practical reasoning as a theory of statutory interpretation in order to
determine whether Indian nations should be covered under these general
federal regulatory laws.
In doing so, the Article addressed the question of statutory
applicability not by asking how important are the tribal sovereign rights
being interfered with but how specific or clear Congress has to be before an
intent to interfere with tribal sovereign rights can be found. In making such
determinations, the Article also asked pragmatic questions and answered
them by taking into consideration the status of Indian nations within our
political, legal, and constitutional system. Thus, the Article has argued for
clear indications of congressional intent before any tribal sovereign right is
interfered with by a law of general applicability. Furthermore, when it
comes to requiring clear indications of congressional intent, there are no
reasons to distinguish between specific Indian treaty right and all other
tribal sovereign rights inherent or implicit in the creation of Indian
reservations. Finally, the Article argued that of all the circuits, the Tenth
Circuit opinion in Pueblo of San Juan represents the more consistent
approach with Practical Reasoning. The Article also endorsed what some
have called a “comity” approach and concluded that when it comes to the
implementation of many of these general federal regulatory laws, there is
no reason to treat Indian nations differently than how other local
governments are treated under those laws.

